



#### **Product overview**

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Tool for Risk management of an ISMS based on a Central Knowledge base





Overview



TRICK Service can be used to:

- 1. Document the organisational context & assets according to ISO/IEC 27005;
- 2. Audit ISO/IEC 27002 compliance and assess resources needed for missing security;
- 3. Qualitatively assess threats, vulnerabilities, risks, through structured brainstorming;
- 4. Guide through quantified assessment of risk scenarios;
- 5. Model dependencies between assets, risk scenarios, and security;
- 6. Quantitatively assess impact and likelihood of risk scenarios applied to selected assets;
- 7. Prepare a risk treatment plan, sorted by implementation phases and Return on Security Investment;
- 8. Prepare Statement of applicability for ISO/IEC 27001 certification;
- 9. Prepare risk analysis report compliant to CSSF circular 12/544
- 10. Assess security maturity.

Methodology





- Follows the guidance of ISO/IEC 27005
- Is ISO/IEC 27001:2013 compliant
- Can be easily integrated in your Information Security Management System (ISMS)
- Prepares reporting to regulator (CSSF, CNPD)

#### Context establishment – Risk analysis scope



#### Describe the context of your organisation

Description	Value
Organisation type	Private company
Profit type	S.à r.l.
Name of organism	itrust consulting
Organism presentation	itrust consulting – acronym for "Information Techniques and Research for Ubiquitous Security and Trust" is a Luxembourg based company founded by Dr Carlo Harpes in 2007. itrust is now a recognised actor in Luxembourg's and Europe's Information Security Field. Organisation chart available on company share: STA_I603_Staff_Organigram.
Sector	Public, financial and private.
Responsible	<ul> <li>Project sponsor: C. Harpes (MD),</li> <li>Project Manager: A. McKinnon (CISO),</li> <li>Project contributors: B. Jager (CIO), G. Schaff (HSO), M. Dimitrova (Human Resources),</li> <li>M. Aubigny (Security Consultant), ISMS Team (employees who contribute to implementation and document creation).</li> </ul>
Manpower	16
Activities	Service for companies: Audit & Hacking; SECaaS; Research & Development; Training and Awareness
Business processes	1. Consulting, Innovation; 2a Audit;

#### Context establishment – Customisable parameters



#### Impact scale (CSSF compatible)

Impact s	scale				
Level	Acronym	Qualification	Value k€	Range min	Range max
0	iO	insignificant	2	0	3
1	i1	i1	4	3	7
2	i2	minor	10	7	13
3	i3	i3	16	13	20
4	i4	serious	25	20	35
5	i5	i5	50	35	71
6	i6	very serious	100	71	141
7	i7	i7	200	141	283
8	i8	extremely serious	400	283	566
9 i9 i9		800	566	1 131	
10	i10	vital	1 600	1 131	+∞

#### Probability scale (CSSF compatible)

Probabi	Probability scale													
Level	Acronym	Qualification	Value /y	Range min	Range max									
0	p0	insignificant (every 100 years)	0,01	0,00	0,01									
1	p1	p1	0,02	0,01	0,02									
2	p2	once every 30 years	0,03	0,02	0,04									
3	р3	р3	0,06	0,04	0,08									
4	p4	once every 10 years	0,10	0,08	0,13									
5	p5	p5	0,18	0,13	0,24									
6	p6	once every 3 years	0,33	0,24	0,44									
7	р7	р7	0,57	0,44	0,76									
8	p8	once every year	1,00	0,76	1,32									
9	p9	p9	1,73	1,32	2,28									
10	p10	once per trimester	3,00	2,28	+∞									

#### Various parameters

Internal setup	External setup	Default lifetime	Max RRF	SOA	Mandatory phase
300	700	5	66	49	1



#### Context establishment - Identification of assets to be considered

🕂 Ad	ld 🖸 Edit	C Estimation	🗘 Sel	ect	Cunselect
□ #	Name	Туре	Value (k€)	ALE (k€)	Comment
□ 1	ÉpStan application	on SW	65	5,7	Application developed internally by itrust consulting.
□ 2	ÉpStan data	Info	40	32,4	Information used in the business process
□ 3	ÉpStan service	Busi	10	13,9	Value based on the yearly revenue generated from the service.
□ 4	ÉpStan server	HW	2	2,1	Server and other hardware needed to operate the ÉpStan service
Total			117	54,1	

#### Asset types:

- Service;
- Information;
- Software;
- Hardware;
- Network;
- Staff;
- Not material value;
- Business (CSSF);
- Financial (CSSF);
- Compliance (CSSF).



## Select and estimate effectiveness and implementation cost of standardised and custom security controls

Standard 27002 ~	6.1.2 - Segregation	n of duties											
Chapter 6	Conflicting duties and are organization's assets.	as of responsibility should	be segregated to reduce opp	portunities for unauthorize	ed or unintentio	nal modification or mi	suse of the						
6 - Organization of inf	Care should be taken that	should be taken that no single person can access, modify or use assets without authorization or detection. The initiation of an event should be separated its authorization. The possibility of collusion should be considered in designing the controls. Small organizations may find segregation of duties difficult to											
6.1 - Internal organizat	achieve, but the principle should be applied as far as is possible and practicable. Whenever it is difficult to segregate, other controls such as monitoring of												
6.1.1 - Information sec	Current status	Initi	al set-up	Maintenan	се	Pla	nning						
6.1.2 - Segregation of	Status Implement.	Internal External Workload Workload	Investment Life time	Internal External	Recurrent	Cost Phase	Responsible						
6.1.3 - Contact with au													
6.1.4 - Contact with sp	AP ~ % 50 ~	md 1 md (	0 k€ 0 a 5	md 2 md 0	k€ 0	k€ 1 1	CIO						
6.1.5 - Information sec	To check												

Qualitative risk analysis



## Qualitatively assess common threats and vulnerabilities, through structured brainstorming

ld	Name	Acro	Ехро	Owner	Comment
1.0.0	Sources				
1.0.1	Natural	Ν	N		Threats not initiated by human beings: Snow, thunderstorms, etc. No increased risk in Niederanven or Berbourg.
1.0.2	Industrial origin	I	+		Petrol station in close proximity to Niederanven offices. Building is also on the flightpath. Risk accepted by MD when deciding upon location.
1.0.3	Technical failure	Τ	Ν		Internal ICT infrastructure maintained by experienced personnel and backup - 1 server: problems can be easily and quickly identified. Server is occasionally unavailable for short periods of time (no real impact).

Risk identification for quantitative risk analysis



#### **Define risk scenarios**

+ Ad	d 🖸 Edit	C Estimation	C Select	Ourse Constant	select		X Delete
<b>#</b>	Name		Тур	e	ALE (k€)	Description	
□ 1	A_1 - Partial los	s or temporary	Ava	ailability	7,3	A part of the asset is lost or the asset is temporarily nonoperational.	
□ 2	A_all - Complete	e loss, including bac	ckup Ava	ailability	8,1	Loss of all asset, including backup.	
□ 3	C1 - Partial thef	t coming from exter	nal Cor	nfidentiality	6,6	An essential part of an asset was stolen without complicity of an internal person.	
□ 4	C2 - Deliberate	disclosure	Cor	nfidentiality	4,2	An internal staff copies the entire asset to disclose it.	
□ 5	C3 - Accidental	disclosure	Cor	nfidentiality	16,7	Following a false handling, an important part becomes accessible to people that a authorized.	are not
□ 6	I1 - External ma	nipulation	Inte	grity	3,3	An external person succeeds penetrating and handling an asset.	
□ 7	I2 - Fraudulent i from internal	manipulation coming	g Inte	egrity	0,3	An internal person handles an asset to create an illicit advantage.	
8	13 - Accidental r	nanipulation	Inte	grity	7,7	A technical or organisational error causes a corruption of an asset.	
Total					54,1		

#### Assess your risks in term of impact & likelihood



	Assets EpStan data ~	E Stan dat	а							
stimate your	Scenarios All ~	Information use	ed in the	busine	ess pro	cess				
sks by asset	Scenarios		Rep.	Op.	Leg.	Fin.	Pro.	ALE		
	A_1 - Partial loss or te	Scenario	(k€)	(k€)	(k€)	(k€)	(/y)	(k€)	Owner	Comment
	A_all - Complete loss, i	C3 - Accidental	0	0	0	i7	p3	11,5		Could occur with bugs in the source code.
	C1 - Partial theft comin		0	0	0	:0	- 0	<b>F 7</b>		
	C2 - Deliberate disclosure	A_all - Complete loss, including backup	0	0	0	16	p3	5,7		A complete loss of online data could happen, which requires escrowed backup data to be restored. It means that the service cannot be
	C3 - Accidental disclosure									provided for about 2 weeks (of full work for 3 staffs). Restore costs including reputations
	I1 - External manipulation									impact and potential loss of contract. The curren year class list have to be regenerated by
	I2 - Fraudulent manipul									teachers, with high error rates.
	13 - Accidental manipul	I3 - Accidental manipulation	0	0	0	i5	р4	5		Backups are also made on a daily basis. Backup of data on different off-sites so if an admin makes an error it can be restored.
	<i>🗐</i> « < >	C2 - Deliberate	0	0	0	i7	p1	3,6		Background checks on all administrators
	» 🕩	disclosure								In case of divulgation, the entire TTP project for all past student is obsolete, i.e. Cost: operationa

#### Assess your risks in term of impact & likelihood



A 1 - Partial loss or temporary Assets All A\_1 - Par Scenarios A part of the asset is lost or the asset is temporarily nonoperational. ... Or estimate your risk by risk Assets Pro. ALE Asset Rep Op. Leg Fin. (k€) Comment Asset value (k€) (k€) (k€) (k€) (/y) Owner scenario ÉpStan application ÉpStan 65 p6 3.3 Risk scenario. Application availability 0 0 0 i2 ÉpStan data requiring a big correction, new installa application and recovery of data. ÉpStan service ÉpStan data 40 0 0 0 p4 2,5 Due to a loss, the recent data are no i4 ÉpStan server available, meaning that test have to b postponed until the bug is fixed. ÉpStan Unavailability of TTP for one week du 10 0 0 0 p3 1.4 i4 test period. Impact: test need to be service rescheduled. ÉpStan 2 0 RAID is applied for disk, enabling the 0 0 p1 0 E replacement of a disk which has faile server ( )≫ Total 7,3



TRICK Service: a tool based on the profitability of security measures (ROSI)

Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) = relative reduction of a given risk by implementing a given security measures.

TRICK Service contains an estimate of RRF for each security measure, each risk, each asset type, which can be fine-tuned if needed.

Those estimates are based on properties of scenario, measures, and assets:

Asset/ Measure	Asset/ Strei			Strength Category				Туре						_						
Measure	[0,10]	[0,4]		[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	[	[0,4]		[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	[0,4]	
Specificity [0,100]	Strength	Sectorial		Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	CSSF-D1		CSSF-I10		Preventive	Detective	Limitative	Corrective	 Intentional	Accidental	Environmental	Internal threat	External threat	-
Asset				{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}		{0,1}		{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	Scenario



#### Risk treatment plan, sorted by implementation phase and ROSI

#	Standard	Reference	To do	ALE (k€)	ΔALE (k€)	CS (k€)	ROI (k€)	IW (md)	EW (md)	INV (k€)	PH.
	Current AL	E		54							
1	27002	6.1.2	Segregation of duties Perform a compliance check on J400 and ensure that rules on segregation of duties are implemented.	51	3	1	3	1	0	0	1
2	27002	8.2.3	Handling of assets Create a procedure on how itrust should interpret security classifications originating from third- parties - create a formal record showing the authorised recipient of assets. Refer to list of NDA, and apply only to documents under NDA.	48	3	0	3	0	0	0	1
3	27002	8.3.2	<b>Disposal of media</b> Review the disposal of media procedure and check it is inline with the actual practice - Create a log of sensitive items that have been disposed of.	46	2	0	2	0	0	0	1
4	27002	6.2.2	Teleworking Validate STA_I711_Use_of_itrust_Systems.	44	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
5	27002	813	Accentable use of assets	11	1	0	1	٥	٥	٥	1

#### **Output: Key indicators**







**Compliance evolution towards best practices and international standards** 



Output



#### **CSSF** compliant risk register

					Raw Eval.		I. Net Eval.				xp I	Eval.			
#	ID	Category	Risk title	Asset	P.	I.	Imp.	Р.	Ι.	Imp.	Ρ.	I.	Imp.	Response	Owner
1	C1	Availability	A_1 - Partial loss or temporary	Staff	7	2	14	7	2	14	7	2	14	Transfer	User 1
2	C2	Integrity	I1 - External manipulation	malware.lu	6	2	12	6	2	12	6	2	12	Reduce	User 2



Output



#### Automatically export all results in a structured report

#### **Management summary**

1 Introduction

Context, Document objectives, Scope, Audience, Document structure, References, Acronyms, Glossary

#### 2 Methodology

- 2.1 Phases of risk management
  - Risk context Risk identification Risks estimation Risks treatment Risk acceptance

#### 3 Risk context

- 3.1 General considerations
- 3.2 Basic criteria

Risk assessment criterion Impact criterion

- Risk acceptance criterion
- 3.3 The target

General considerations Organisation chart Table of assets

3.4 Organisation of risk management

**Risk assessment** 4 4.1 General aspect of the security 4.2 Threats mapping Approach Details Conclusion 4.3 Specific Risks Approach Details Conclusion 4.4 **Risk estimation** Introduction Table of estimated risks for each asset Summary of the current level of risk 5 Implementation level of ISO 27002 6 **Risk treatment plan** 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Specific recommendations 6.3 General ISO 27002 related recommendations **Risk evaluation and conclusions** 7 Annexes: Statement of applicability State of implementation of ISO 27002 security measures

Continuous improvement



Update and fine-tune yearly your Risk Assessment

#### Continously improve with TRICK Service:

Improve by modeling critical parts, e.g. with CORAS, attack trees or other ISO 31010 techniques:







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**TRICK Service** obtained useful features since then: be it the calculation of profitability, the structuring of threats and risks, the costs of the security process (after ISO 27001) and security measures (of ISO 27002), the Luxembourgish requirements of dematerialisation and archiving, the thresholds and registers of CSSF, the evolution of security maturity, and many more.



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